The component fairness solution for cycle-free graph games by Herings, P.J.J. et al.
TI 2005-114/1 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 
 
The Component Fairness Solution for 
Cycle-free Graph Games 
 P. Jean-Jacques Herings1
Gerard van der Laan2
Dolf Talman3
 
1 Department of Economics, Maastricht University; 
2 Department of Econometrics, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, and Tinbergen Institute; 
3 Dept. of Econometrics & Operations Research, and CentER. Tilburg University. 
 
  
Tinbergen Institute 
The Tinbergen Institute is the institute for 
economic research of the Erasmus Universiteit 
Rotterdam, Universiteit van Amsterdam, and Vrije 
Universiteit Amsterdam. 
 
Tinbergen Institute Amsterdam 
Roetersstraat 31 
1018 WB Amsterdam 
The Netherlands 
Tel.: +31(0)20 551 3500 
Fax: +31(0)20 551 3555 
 
Tinbergen Institute Rotterdam 
Burg. Oudlaan 50 
3062 PA Rotterdam 
The Netherlands 
Tel.: +31(0)10 408 8900 
Fax: +31(0)10 408 9031 
 
 
Please send questions and/or remarks of non-
scientific nature to driessen@tinbergen.nl. 
Most TI discussion papers can be downloaded at 
http://www.tinbergen.nl. 
The Component Fairness Solution for Cycle-Free
Graph Games
P. Jean-Jacques Herings∗ Gerard van der Laan† Dolf Talman‡
December 5, 2005
∗P.J.J. Herings, Department of Economics, Maastricht University, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD
Maastricht, The Netherlands, e-mail: P.Herings@algec.unimaas.nl.
†G. van der Laan, Department of Econometrics and Tinbergen Institute, Vrije Universiteit,
De Boelelaan 1105, 1081 HV Amsterdam, The Netherlands, e-mail: glaan@feweb.vu.nl.
‡A.J.J. Talman, Department of Econometrics & Operations Research and CentER, Tilburg
University, P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands, e-mail:talman@uvt.nl.
Abstract
In this paper we study cooperative games with limited cooperation possibilities, represented
by an undirected cycle-free communication graph. Players in the game can cooperate if and
only if they are connected in the graph, i.e. they can communicate with one another. We
introduce a new single-valued solution concept, the component fairness solution. Our solu-
tion is characterized by component eﬃciency and component fairness. The interpretation
of component fairness is that deleting a link between two players yields for both resulting
components the same average change in payoﬀ, where the average is taken over the players
in the component. Component fairness replaces the axiom of fairness characterizing the
Myerson value, where the players whose link is deleted face the same loss in payoﬀ. The
component fairness solution is always in the core of the restricted game in case the game
is superadditive and can be easily computed as the average of n speciﬁc marginal vectors,
where n is the number of players. We also show that the component fairness solution can
be generated by a speciﬁc distribution of the Harsanyi-dividends.
Keywords: TU-game, communication structure, Myerson value, fairness, marginal vec-
tor.
AMS subject classification: 90B18, 91A12, 91A43.
JEL code: C71.
1 Introduction
A situation in which a ﬁnite set of players can obtain certain payoﬀs by cooperation can
be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game, being
a pair (N, v), where N is a ﬁnite set of players and v: 2N → IR is a characteristic function
on N such that v(∅) = 0. For any subset S ∈ 2N , v(S) is the worth of coalition S, i.e. the
members of coalition S can obtain a total payoﬀ of v(S) by agreeing to cooperate. Unless
stated otherwise, we assume that N = {1, . . . , n}, i.e. N is a set of n players, indexed by
i = 1, . . . , n, and we denote a game (N, v) shortly by its characteristic function v.
A payoff vector x ∈ IRn of a game v is an n-dimensional vector giving a payoﬀ
xi ∈ IR to any player i ∈ N . In the following we denote x(S) =
∑
i∈S xi, S ∈ 2
N . A payoﬀ
vector x is efficient if it exactly distributes the worth v(N) of the ‘grand coalition’ N , i.e.
if x(N) = v(N). A solution for TU-games is a mapping F that assigns to every game v a
set of payoﬀ vectors F (v) ⊂ IRn. A solution F is eﬃcient if for any game v every element in
F (v) is eﬃcient. A classical solution is the core, see Gillies [6], which assigns to any game v
the set C(v) of undominated eﬃcient payoﬀ vectors, i.e. x(N) = v(N) and x(S) ≥ v(S) for
all S ∈ 2N . The best known single-valued solution is the Shapley value, see Shapley [15],
assigning to any game v the average ψ(v) of all marginal vectors. For some permutation
π on N , the corresponding marginal vector mπ(v) ∈ IRn assigns to every player i a payoﬀ
mπi (v) = v(π
i ∪ {i})− v(πi), where πi = {j ∈ N |π(j) < π(i)}, i.e. πi is the set of players
preceding i in the permutation π. Since every marginal vector is eﬃcient, the Shapley
value is an eﬃcient solution. A game v is convex if v(S ∪ T ) + v(S ∩ T ) ≥ v(S) + v(T )
for all S, T ∈ 2N and superadditive if v(S ∪ T ) ≥ v(S) + v(T ) for all S, T ∈ 2N such that
S∩T = ∅. The core of a game is equal to the convex hull of all marginal vectors if and only
if the game is convex. In that case the Shapley value is an element of the core. In general,
the Shapley value may be outside the core, even if the core is not empty. Moreover, the
core is nonempty if and only if the game is balanced, see Bondareva [1].
In this paper we study cooperative games with limited cooperation possibilities,
represented by an undirected communication graph as introduced by Myerson [12]. The
vertices in the graph represent the players and the edges represent the communication links
between the players. Players can only cooperate if they are connected. This yields a so-
called graph game, given by a triple (N, v, L) with N the set of players, v the characteristic
function and L the set of edges (communication links) in the graph (N,L) on the set of
nodes N . Since in graph games only connected coalitions can cooperate, the core reduces
to the set of component eﬃcient payoﬀ vectors that are not dominated by any connected
coalition, i.e.
C(v, L) = {x ∈ IRn|x(S) = v(S), S ∈ CLm(N), and x(S) ≥ v(S), S ∈ C
L(N)},
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where CL(N) is the collection of all connected subsets of N in the graph (N,L) and CLm(N)
is the collection of all components of N in the graph, see also Section 2 for these notions.
The set C(v, L) equals the core C(vL) of the so-called restricted game vL, deﬁned by
Myerson [12] as
vL(S) =
∑
T∈CLm(S)
v(T ), S ∈ 2N ,
where CLm(S) is the collection of components of S induced by the graph (N,L). A single-
valued solution for graph games is a function f that assigns to every graph game (N, v, L)
a unique payoﬀ vector f(v, L) ∈ IRn. The so-called Myerson value, to be denoted by µ,
is the solution that assigns to any graph game the Shapley value of the restricted game,
so µ(v, L) = ψ(vL). The Myerson value can be characterized by component eﬃciency, i.e.∑
i∈S µi(v, L) = v(S) if S ∈ C
L
m(N), and fairness. The latter property says that deleting
a link between two players yields for both players the same change in payoﬀ. Clearly, the
Myerson value is the average of all marginal vectors of vL and is guaranteed to be in the core
if the restricted game is convex. Alternative characterizations of the Myerson value have
been given in Myerson [13] and Borm et al. [2]. In the latter paper also another solution
for graph games has been proposed, the so-called positional value, see also Meessen [11].
This value is also characterized by component eﬃciency and by balanced total threats, see
Slikker [16]. The balanced total threat property says that the total threat of any player
towards another player equals to the total threat of that player towards the ﬁrst player,
where the total threat of a player towards another player is the sum over all links of the
ﬁrst player of payoﬀ diﬀerences the second player experiences if such a link is broken.
From Kaneko and Wooders [9] and Le Breton, Owen and Weber [10] it follows that
C(vL) is not empty if the graph (N,L) contains no cycles and v is superadditive, see also
Demange [4]. For an arbitrarily taken node, a cycle-free graph induces a tree with the
given node as root. Demange assigns to any node taken as root a particular marginal
vector and shows that this vector is in the core of the restricted game vL. Interpreting
the tree as a hierarchy on the set of players, Demange [5] argues that hierarchies yield
stability, in the sense that there exist undominated payoﬀ vectors under the mild condition
of superadditivity, providing a rationale for the fact that a group organizes itself in a
hierarchy to achieve coordination.
In this paper we provide a new single-valued solution concept for cycle-free graph
games. To do so we replace Myerson’s fairness by an alternative fairness property, to be
called component fairness. This property says that deleting a link between two players
yields for both resulting components the same average change in payoﬀ, where the average
is taken over the players in the component. The new solution is characterized by component
eﬃciency and component fairness. It is easy to compute the new solution. We prove that
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it equals the average of the n marginal vectors considered by Demange. It follows that
the component fairness solution belongs to the core of the restricted game if the game is
superadditive. So, contrary to the Myerson value and the position value the new value is
in that case always an element of the core. We also compare the three values in terms of
distributions of the so-called Harsanyi-dividends, see Harsanyi [8].
This paper has been organized as follows. In Section 2 we give some preliminary
notions of graph theory. In Section 3 we introduce the concept of component fairness
solution and prove that component eﬃciency and component fairness fully characterize
the component fairness solution on the class of cycle-free graph games. We also show that
it equals the average of n speciﬁc marginal vectors, for each player one. In Section 4 we
show that in case the game is superadditive the component fairness solution lies in the core
and we compare the new value with the Myerson value and the position value. Section 5
concludes.
2 Some Notions in Graph Theory
In this section we present some notions in graph theory that are needed for our results. An
undirected graph is a pair (N,L) where N is a set of nodes1 and L is a collection of edges,
i.e. L ⊆ {{i, j}|i, j ∈ N, i = j} is a collection of subsets of N such that each element
of L contains precisely two elements of N . Node j is adjacent to node i if {i, j} ∈ L.
Because the elements of L will represent binary communication links between the players,
in the sequel we call them links instead of edges. For K ∈ 2N , the graph (K,L(K)) with
L(K) = {l ∈ L|l ⊆ K} is called the subgraph of (N,L) on K. The number of nodes in K
being adjacent to node i ∈ K in subgraph (K,L(K)) is called i’s degree in (K,L(K)) and
is given by dLK(i) = |{j ∈ K|{i, j} ∈ L(K)}|.
A sequence of k diﬀerent nodes (i1, . . . , ik) is a path in a graph (N,L) if {ih, ih+1} ∈ L
for h = 1, . . . , k − 1. Two nodes i, j ∈ N are connected in the graph (N,L) if there exists
a path (i1, . . . , ik) with i1 = i and ik = j. A graph (N,L) is connected if any two nodes
i, j ∈ N are connected in (N,L). In a given graph (N,L), a set of nodes K is said to be a
connected subset of N when the subgraph (K,L(K)) is connected. A subset K of N is a
component of (N,L) if the subgraph (K,L(K)) is maximally connected, i.e. (K,L(K)) is
connected and for any j ∈ N \K, the subgraph (K ∪ {j}, L(K ∪ {j})) is not connected.
Note that the collection of components of (N,L) forms a partition of N . The collection
of all connected subsets of K in the subgraph (K,L(K)) of (N,L) is denoted by CL(K).
The collection of all components of (N,L) is denoted by CLm(N). A sequence of nodes
1Since in this paper the nodes in a graph represent the players in a game we use the same notation for
both the set of nodes and the set of players.
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(i1, . . . , ik+1) is a cycle in (N,L) if (i) k ≥ 2, (ii) all nodes i1, . . . , ik are diﬀerent elements
of N , (iii) ik+1 = i1 and (iv) {ih, ih+1} ∈ L for h = 1, . . . , k. A graph (N,L) is cycle-free
when it does not contain any cycle.
A directed graph is a pair (N,D) where N is a set of nodes and D is a collection
of directed edges, i.e. D ⊆ {(i, j)|i, j ∈ N, i = j}. If (i, j) ∈ D, then the node j is a
successor of i and i is a predecessor of j. We say that j = i is a subordinate of i if there is a
sequence of directed edges (ih, ih+1) ∈ D, h = 1, . . . , k, such that i1 = i and ik+1 = j. We
denote the set of subordinates of i in (N,D) by SD(i) and denote S
c
D(i) = SD(i)∪{i}. For
K ∈ 2N , the directed graph (K,D(K)) with D(K) = {(i, j) ∈ D|i, j ∈ K} is called the
directed subgraph of (N,L) on K. A directed graph (N,D) is a tree if there is one node in
N , called the root or top-node, having no predecessors in D and there is a unique sequence
of directed edges in (N,D) from this node to any other node in N . Let (N,D) be the
undirected graph induced by (N,D), i.e. D = {{i, j}|(i, j) ∈ D}. A directed graph (N,D)
is a forest if for every component K of (N,D) the directed subgraph (K,D(K)) is a tree.
A directed graph (N,D) represents a hierarchy on N when (N,D) is a forest. Clearly, in
a forest (N,D) we have that ScD(j) ⊆ SD(i) when j is a subordinate of i.
Finally, let (N,L) be a cycle-free undirected graph and K a component of (N,L)
consisting of k = |K| nodes. Then every node i ∈ K induces a unique tree T (i) on K in
the following way. For any j ∈ K \ {i}, take the unique path in (K,L(K)) from i to j,
then change the undirected edges on this path to directed edges in such a way that the
ﬁrst node in any ordered pair is the node that comes ﬁrst on the path from i to j. In this
way the undirected cycle-free subgraph (K,L(K)) induces k diﬀerent trees, one tree for
each of the k diﬀerent nodes of K. For a component K of (N,L), we denote by TKL the
collection of all |K| trees on K induced by the undirected graph (N,L).
3 Component Fairness Solution
In this section we deﬁne a new solution concept for cycle-free graph games and we prove that
this is the unique solution satisfying the properties of component eﬃciency and component
fairness. Let (N, v, L) be a cycle-free graph game. For a componentK of (N,L) and i ∈ K,
let T (i) ∈ TKL be the unique tree with player i as its top-player and, with a slight abuse
of notation, let ST (i)(j) and S
c
T (i)(j) be the sets of subordinates of j in T (i), without and
including j, respectively. Further, deﬁne by LT (i)(j) = {h ∈ K|(j, h) ∈ T (i)} the set of
successors of j in T (i). We now associate to player j in T (i) payoﬀs tij(v, L) given by
tij(v, L) = v(S
c
T (i)(j))−
∑
h∈LT (i)(j)
v(ScT (i)(h)). (3.1)
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So, the payoﬀ to player j ∈ K is equal to the worth of the coalition consisting of player j
and all his subordinates in T (i) minus the sum of the worths of the coalitions consisting
of any successor of player j and all subordinates of this successor in T (i). By the tree
structure of T (i) we have that for every player j ∈ K the sets ScT (i)(h), h ∈ LT (i)(j), form
a partitioning of ST (i)(j) and thus
tij(v, L) = v(S
c
T (i)(j))− v
L(ST (i)(j)), (3.2)
where the second right hand term is the restricted worth of the coalition consisting of
all subordinates of j in the tree T (i). So, the payoﬀ to player j in tree T (i) is equal to
what player j contributes when he joins his subordinates in T (i). Clearly, the set ScT (i)(j)
itself is connected, so when joining his subordinates, player j connects all the subsets of
subordinates of his successors to one connected set and receives his marginal contribution to
it. Observe that a player j ∈ K receives his own worth v({j}) when j has no subordinates
in the tree T (i). More generally, the total payoﬀ to a player j and all his subordinates in
T (i) is equal to the worth of the coalition ScT (i)(j), i.e.∑
h∈Sc
T (i)
(j)
tih(v, L) = v(S
c
T (i)(j)), j ∈ K. (3.3)
We now deﬁne the Component Fairness solution CF as the solution assigning to each cycle-
free graph game (N, v, L) the payoﬀ vector in which player j in a component K ∈ CLm(N)
receives the average of all the payoﬀs tij(v, L) in the |K| trees T (i), i ∈ K, in T
K
L .
Definition 3.1 Component Fairness Solution
On the class of cycle-free graph games, the Component Fairness (CF) solution assigns to
any (N, v, L) the payoff vector CF(v, L) given by
CFj(v, L) =
1
|K|
∑
i∈K
tij(v, L), j ∈ K, K ∈ C
L
m(N).
To characterize the CF-solution we state the following properties for a solution f
on the class of cycle-free graph games.
Axiom 3.2 Component Efficiency
A solution f on the class of cycle-free graph games is component eﬃcient if for any game
(N, v, L) it holds that
∑
i∈K fi(v, L) = v(K) for each K ∈ C
L
m(N).
To state the next axiom, for a component K and a link {i, j} ∈ L(K), let Kh be the
component in (N,L \ {i, j}) containing h, h = i, j. Clearly, Kh is the subset of K of
players connected to h in the graph that results after deleting the link {i, j}.
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Axiom 3.3 Component Fairness
A solution f on the class of cycle-free graph games satisfies component fairness if for any
(N, v, L) it holds that
1
|Ki|
∑
h∈Ki
(fh(v, L)− fh(v, L \ {i, j})) =
1
|Kj|
∑
h∈Kj
(fh(v, L)− fh(v, L \ {i, j})) ,
for all {i, j} ∈ L(K), K ∈ CLm(N).
The ﬁrst property is standard and has been introduced by Myerson [12]. The second
property is an alternative to the Myerson fairness property which states that fi(v, L) −
fi(v, L\{i, j}) = fj(v, L)−fj(v, L\{i, j}) for any {i, j} ∈ L. The Myerson fairness property
states that two players i and j linked directly together face the same loss in payoﬀ when
the link between them is deleted from the set of links. On the class of cycle-free graphs, any
link is crucial because deleting a link breaks the component into two parts. Considering
a link {i, j} in a component K we have that all players in Ki are only connected to the
players in Kj through the link between i and j. One may argue that h, h = i, j, behaves on
behalf of all players in Kh in sustaining the link {i, j}. The component fairness property
states then that when a link {i, j} between i and j is deleted, the average change in the
payoﬀs of the players in Ki is equal to the average change in payoﬀs of the players in Kj .
Observe that superadditivity and component eﬃciency implies that on average the players
face a loss in payoﬀ when a link is deleted.
We now state the main theorem, which says that the CF-solution is the unique
solution satisfying component eﬃciency and component fairness.
Theorem 3.4 A solution f on the class of cycle-free graph games is equal to the CF-
solution if and only if it satisfies component efficiency and component fairness.
Proof.
First, suppose that f satisﬁes component eﬃciency and component fairness. For any
graph game (N, v, L), let l = |L| be the number of links and c = |CLm(N)| the number of
components in (N,L). Observe that l+ c = n, because the graph is cycle-free. Component
eﬃciency implies that∑
h∈K
fh(v, L) = v(K), for all K ∈ C
L
m(N). (3.4)
Also because of component eﬃciency we have
∑
h∈Ki fh(v, L \ {i, j}) = v(K
i) and
∑
h∈Kj
fh(v, L\{i, j}) = v(Kj) for any link {i, j} in L(K). Therefore, component fairness reduces
to
1
|Ki|
(∑
h∈Ki
fh(v, L)− v(K
i)
)
=
1
|Kj|
(∑
h∈Kj
fh(v, L)− v(K
j)
)
, (3.5)
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for all {i, j} ∈ L(K) and K ∈ CLm(N).
2 Since there are c equations of type (3.4) and l
equations of type (3.5) and all the c + l = n equations are linearly independent, these
equations uniquely determine f(v, L).
It remains to prove that the CF-solution satisﬁes the two properties. First, since
i ∈ K is the top-player in the tree T (i) on component K and thus ScT (i)(i) = K, for any
i ∈ K it follows from equation (3.3) that∑
h∈K
tih(v, L) =
∑
h∈Sc
T (i)
(i)
tih(v, L) = v(S
c
T (i)(i)) = v(K).
Hence,∑
h∈K
CFh(v, L) =
∑
h∈K
1
|K|
∑
i∈K
tih(v, L)
=
1
|K|
∑
i∈K
∑
h∈K
tih(v, L) =
1
|K|
∑
i∈K
v(K) = v(K),
which shows component eﬃciency.
To show component fairness, suppose link {i, j} is deleted in some component K.
Component eﬃciency implies that for both components Ki and Kj in the graph (N,L \
{i, j}) it holds that
∑
h′∈Kh CFh′(v, L\{i, j}) = v(K
h), h = i, j. Further, consider the tree
T (h) on K for some h ∈ Ki, then by deﬁnition of th(v, L) we have that∑
h′∈Kj
thh′(v, L) = v(K
j). (3.6)
On the other hand, for h ∈ Kj it holds that∑
h′∈Kj
thh′(v, L) = v(K)− v(K
i). (3.7)
Since there are |K i| equations of type (3.6) and |Kj| equations of type (3.7), we obtain
that ∑
h∈Kj
CFh(v, L) =
1
|K|
(
|Ki|v(Kj) + |Kj|(v(K)− v(Ki))
)
.
With |Ki|+ |Kj| = |K| it follows that∑
h∈Kj
(CFh(v, L)− CFh(v, L \ {i, j})) =
1
|K|
(
|Ki|v(Kj) + |Kj|(v(K)− v(Ki))
)
− v(Kj) =
|Kj|
|K|
(
v(K)− v(Ki)− v(Kj)
)
.
2Observe that because of this reduced form of the component fairness property, it is not needed to use
induction on the number of links, as in the proof of the uniqueness of the Myerson value, in which one
first has to determine the values fh(v, L \ {i, j}) for h = i, j.
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Analogously it follows that∑
h∈Ki
(CFh(v, L)− CFh(v, L \ {i, j})) =
|Ki|
|K|
(
v(K)− v(Ki)− v(Kj)
)
,
which shows that CF satisﬁes component fairness. 
From the proof it follows that the CF-solution satisﬁes the property that when a link
{i, j} connects two subcomponents Ki and Kj to form component K the surplus v(K)−
v(Ki)− v(Kj) obtained from this connection is distributed among the two subcomponents
proportional to the number of players in these subcomponents. In the next section we will
consider some more properties of the CF-solution and compare this solution with other
solutions for graph games.
4 Properties and Comparison
Consider a connected cycle-free graph (N,L), so that N is the unique component. Then
the CF-solution becomes
CFj(v, L) =
1
n
∑
i∈N
tij(v, L), j ∈ N,
where ti(v, L) ∈ IRn is the payoﬀ vector deﬁned by equation (3.1) when i is the top-player
in the tree T (i) on N induced by (N,L). Suppose that v is superadditive. It has been
shown by Demange [5] that the vector ti(v, L) in which a player j gets a payoﬀ equal to the
worth of the coalition consisting of himself with all his subordinates minus the restricted
worth of the coalition of his subordinates is in the core of the restricted game vL. In fact,
it holds that vL is permutationally convex for any permutation π satisfying πj < πh when
j is a subordinate of h on a tree T (i) on N , see for instance van Velzen [17]. According
to Granot and Huberman [7] this implies that the corresponding marginal vector mπ is in
the core of vL. It is straightforward to verify that ti(v, L) = mπ(vL) for any permutation π
that satisﬁes the condition above for the tree T (i). Since the core is convex and CF(v, L)
is the average of all vectors ti(v, L), i ∈ N , this implies that the CF-solution is stable in
the sense that it is in the core of vL and thus cannot be dominated by any coalition. The
discussion above generalizes straigtforwardly in case the graph (N,L) consists of several
components. Since stability implies the weaker condition of component eﬃciency, we have
the following important corollary.
Corollary 4.1
On the class of cycle-free superadditive graph games the CF-solution is the unique solution
satisfying stability and component fairness.
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The corollary not only says that the CF-solution is the unique stable solution satisfy-
ing component fairness, it also says that there exists a solution being stable and component
fair. This makes the CF-solution an attractive alternative to other solutions such as the
Myerson value and the position value which may not be stable, even not on the class of
cycle-free games. The Myerson value µ(v, L), characterized by component eﬃciency and
fairness, satisﬁes, for any link {i, j} ∈ L,
µi(v, L)− µi(v, L \ {i, j}) = µj(v, L)− µj(v, L \ {i, j}).
It is equal to the Shapley value ψ(vL) of the restricted game vL, implying that it may be
outside the core of vL when vL is not convex. So, fairness may contradict the requirement
of stability. Also the position value, denoted by γ(v, L), introduced for the class of all graph
games and characterized on the class of cycle-free graph games in Borm et al. [2], does not
need to be stable. Slikker [16] characterizes the position value on the class of graph games
as the unique solution satisfying component eﬃciency and balanced total threats, saying
that the total threat of any player i towards another player j is equal to the total threat of
player j towards player i. The total threat of a player i towards another player j is deﬁned
as the sum over all links of player i of the payoﬀ diﬀerences player j experiences if such a
link is broken, i.e. for each pair of players i, j ∈ N it holds that∑
h|{i,h}∈L
(γj(v, L)− γj(v, L \ {i, h})) =
∑
h|{j,h}∈L
(γi(v, L)− γi(v, L \ {j, h})) .
The next example shows that also the balanced threat property may contradict the re-
quirement of stability, i.e. also the position value may be outside the core.
Example 4.2 Let (N, v, L) be given byN = {1, 2, 3}, v({1, 2}) = 1, v({2, 3}) = v(N) = 2,
v(S) = 0, otherwise and L = {{1, 2}, {2, 3}}. Observe that vL = v, so that the Myerson
value equals the Shapley value: µ(v, L) = ψ(vL) = ψ(v) = (1/6, 7/6, 2/3)⊤. To obtain
the position value, straightforward calculations show that γ(v, L \ {1, 2}) = (0, 1, 1)⊤ and
γ(v, L\{2, 3}) = (1
2
, 1
2
, 0)⊤. Then, it follows that γ(v, L) = (1
4
, 1, 3
4
)⊤ by solving the system
of three equations given by the component eﬃciency property and the two balanced threat
property equations between 1 and 2 and between 3 and 2. Since x1 = 0 for any payoﬀ
vector x in the core of vL, this shows that both the Myerson value and the position value
are not stable. Finally, the component fairness solution follows easily as the average of the
three vectors ti(v, L), i = 1, 2, 3, and is given by CF(v, L) = (0, 5/3, 1/3), which is in the
core.
Next we compare the three values in terms of distributions of the so-called Harsanyi
dividends. Let Ω be the collection of nonempty subsets of N . Then, for T ∈ Ω, the
unanimity game uT on N is given by uT (S) = 1 if T ⊆ S, and uT (S) = 0 otherwise.
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Leaving out v(∅), it is well-kown that the collection of unanimity games forms a basis in
IR2
n−1 for the class of TU-games on N , i.e. for any game v represented as a (2n−1)-vector
with the worths of the non-empty coalitions as its components, it holds that
v =
∑
S∈Ω
∆S(v)uS, (4.8)
where the coeﬃcients ∆S(v) are the Harsanyi dividends, see Harsanyi [8], given by
∆S(v) =
∑
T⊆S
(−1)|S|−|T |v(T ), S ∈ Ω. (4.9)
It is well-known that the Shapley value can be obtained by distributing the Harsanyi
dividend of coalition S equivalently among the players in S,
ψi(v) =
∑
S∈Ω|i∈S
1
|S|
∆S(v), i ∈ N.
The Shapley payoﬀ to player i is equal to the sum over all coalitions S containing player i
of a share 1
|S|
of the dividend of coalition S.
Consider a cycle-free graph game (N, v, L). For a connected set S, a node i ∈ S is
extreme if S\{i} is connected in the subgraph (N\{i}, L(N\{i})). The set of extreme nodes
of S is denoted by Ex(S). Owen [14], see also Borm et al. [2], showed that the dividends
of the restricted game can be expressed as sum of the dividends of the underlying game v,
∆S(vL) =
{ ∑
T∈Σ(S)∆
T (v), if S is connected,
0, otherwise,
where Σ(S) = {T ⊆ S|Ex(S) ⊆ T}. Since the dividends of not connected coalitions are
zero, for the restricted game of a cycle-free graph game (N, v, L) equation (4.8) reduces to
vL =
∑
S∈CL(N)
∆S(vL)uS (4.10)
and the payoﬀs according to the Myerson value follow by distributing the dividends of the
connected coalitions equally among its players
µi(v, L) =
∑
S∈CL(N)|i∈S
1
|S|
∆S(vL), i ∈ N.
As follows from Borm et al. [2], see also van den Brink et al. [3], the position value is
obtained by distributing the dividend of any connected coalition S proportional among its
players according to the degrees of the players in the subgraph (S,L(S)), i.e. the payoﬀ of
player i according to the position value is given by
γi(v, L) =
∑
S∈CL(N)|i∈S
dLS(i)∑
j∈S d
L
S(j)
∆S(vL), i ∈ N.
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Comparing the two values shows that in the position value the more central players, that
means players with more neighbours, get higher shares in the dividends.3
Also the component fairness solution can be obtained by distributing the dividends
appropriately. To derive these distributions, for each connected S in (N,L) and j ∈ S, let
pLS(j) be the number of players outside S represented by j in S. We say that player j ∈ S
represents player k outside S, if k is connected to j and on the unique path connecting j
and k all players between j and k are outside S. So,
pLS(j) =
∑
h∈N\S|{j,h}∈L
|Kh|,
where, as in the previous section,Kh is the component of the graph (N,L\{j, h}) containing
player h. Clearly, player j connects the players in S with the players inKh in the sense that
link {j, h} is on the path between any player i in S and any player k in the set Kh ⊆ N \S.
Notice that for some players j, pLS(j) = 0. We now have the following result.
Theorem 4.3 The payoff of player i according to the CF-solution is given by
CFi(v, L) =
∑
S∈CL(N)|i∈S
1 + pLS(i)
|S|+
∑
j∈S p
L
S(j)
∆S(vL), i ∈ N.
Proof.
First, observe that CF is linear, i.e. for two games v and w and coeﬃcients α, β ∈ IR, it
holds that CF(αv + βw,L) = αCF(v, L) + βCF(w,L). This follows from the fact that the
CF-solution is the average of speciﬁc marginal vectors of the restricted game vL, where the
choice of the marginal vectors is independent of the payoﬀs. Further, observe that uLS = uS
if S is connected in (N,L). Hence, with equation (4.10) it follows that
CFi(v, L) =
∑
S∈CL(N)
CFi(uS, L)∆
S(vL), i ∈ N.
Let S be a connected coalition in (N,L) and let T ∈ CLm(N) be the component of (N,L)
containing S. Since uS(K) = 0 for each component K = T , it follows from component
eﬃciency and component fairness that CFj(uS, L) = 0 for all j ∈ T . Further uS(T ) = 1,
so component eﬃciency requires that
∑
j∈T CFj(uS, L) = 1. Consider players j ∈ T \ S
and i ∈ S and on the path (i1, . . . , ir), with i1 = j and ir = i, from j to i, let, for some
index t, it be the last player outside S (and thus it+1 the ﬁrst player in S). Then delete
3Since dividends may be negative, this does not necessarily mean that in the position value the more
central players get higher payoffs than in the Myerson value. In the example above, the coalition {1, 2}
has dividend 1, coalition {2, 3} has dividend 2 and the grand coalition N has dividend -1. Since in the
latter coalition the central player 2 has degree two and the other players degree one, the position value
gives a lower payoff to the central player 2 than the Myerson value.
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the link {it, it+1} and consider the component K
it in the graph (N,L \ {it, it+1}). Then
j ∈ Kit and S ⊆ Kit+1 . Since uS(Kit) = 0 and uS(Kit+1) = 1, component eﬃciency
requires that
∑
h∈Kit CFh(uS, L \ {it, it+1}) = 0 and
∑
h∈Kit+1 CFh(uS, L \ {it, it+1}) = 1.
Since this holds for any j ∈ T \ S, it follows by applying the component fairness property
that also CFj(uS, L) = 0 for all j ∈ T \ S and thus for all j not in S. Consequently,∑
i∈S CFi(uS, L) = 1. Now, for any two linked players i and j in S, let u
L\{i,j}
S be the
restricted game of uS on (N,L \ {i, j}). Since S is not connected anymore, u
L\{i,j}
S (T ) = 0
for any T ∈ 2N , i.e. the restricted game is the null-game, yielding worth zero to any
coalition. Consequently, CFj(uS, L \ {i, j}) = 0 for all j. Hence the component fairness
property requires that for each pair i, j ∈ S with {i, j} ∈ L,∑
h∈Ki
CFh(uS, L) =
∑
h∈Kj
CFh(uS, L).
Since S is connected, there are |S|−1 links in S and thus |S|−1 of such equations. Together
with
∑
i∈S CFi(uS, L) = 1 we have a system of |S| linearly independent equations with |S|
unknowns, yielding a unique solution. It is easy to verify that the solution is given by
CFi(uS, L) =
1 + pLS(i)
|S|+
∑
j∈S p
L
S(j)
, i ∈ S.
Doing this for any connected S, the theorem follows from equation (4.10) and the linearity
of the CF-solution. 
Theorem 4.3 shows that the CF-solution can be obtained by distributing the div-
idend of any connected coalition S among the players in S in such a way that the share
of player i ∈ S in the dividend of coalition S is given by (1 + pLS(i))/(|S| +
∑
j∈S p
L
S(j)).
The weight 1 + pLS(i) is equal to the number of players on behalf of which player i acts
in S, including himself, i.e. one plus the number of players outside S in the component
containing S and being connected to i through a path of players outside S. Recall from
above that the Myerson value is obtained by distributing the dividend of any connected
coalition equally among the players in S and the position value is obtained by distributing
the dividends according to the degree of each player in the subgraph (S, L(S)). In both
these cases the shares of the players in the dividends only depend on the structure of the
subgraph (S,L(S)). In fact, the Myerson value only depends on the number of players in
S. In contrast, for the CF-solution the shares also depend on the structure of the graph
(N,L) outside S. Indeed, the shares depend on the structure of the whole subgraph on
the component K containing S. As a result, the CF-solution for the unanimity game uS
will change when the graph changes on K but not on S, whereas the other two solutions
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can only change when the graph changes on S itself. More precisely, when {i, j} is a link
of L not on S but on the component K containing S, we have that
µ(uS, L) = µ(uS, L \ {i, j}) and γ(uS, L) = γ(uS, L \ {i, j}),
but
CF(uS, L) = CF(uS, L \ {i, j}).
As has been shown in Borm et al. [2], both the Myerson value and the position value
satisfy the so-called superfluous link property. A link {i, j} ∈ L is superfluous in a graph
game (N, v, L) if vE(N) = vE∪{i,j}(N) for all E ⊆ L\{i, j}, so when for each subset of links
E not containing {i, j}, the restricted value of the grand coalition on the graph (N,E) is
equal to the restricted value of it on the graph (N,E ∪ {i, j}). A solution f satisﬁes the
superﬂuous link property if f(v, L) = f(v, L \ {i, j}) whenever {i, j} is a superﬂuous link
in (v, L). Clearly, any link outside S is a superﬂuous link in the graph game (N,uS, L).
Since deleting such a link may change the CF-solution, CF does not satisfy the superﬂuous
link property.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we propose a new value for cycle-free graph games. In such games players
are only able to cooperate if they are connected to each other. In case of superadditivity,
the core of the game is non-empty and contains for each player a speciﬁc marginal vector.
This marginal vector is induced by a tree in which that player is the root and the directed
edges correspond to the undirected edges of the graph. The solution is then the average of
these marginal vectors. Since all these marginal vectors are an element of the core, the new
value is also an element of the core, even if the game is not convex. This is in contrast to
the Myerson value and the position value. These values may not be elements of the core.
The new value has been axiomatized by component eﬃciency and component fair-
ness. The latter property says that if a link is deleted, the average loss per player is the
same in the two subcomponents resulting after deletion of the link. This means that the
surplus in worth obtained from a link is distributed over these two subcomponents propor-
tional to their number of players. In this respect the value diﬀers from the Myerson value
and the position value. The Myerson value is characterized by component eﬃciency and
by fairness, the property that if a link is deleted, then the two players that were connected
by this link have equal loss. This loss is therefore not related to the size of the components
resulting after the deletion of the link. The position value is characterized by component
eﬃciency and balanced total threats, the property that the total threat of a player towards
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another player is equal to the total threat of the latter player towards the former player.
The component fairness solution may fail to satisfy balanced total threats.
In terms of distributions of Harsanyi-dividends the new solution is obtained by
distributing the dividends of a connected coalition among its members in such a way that
the share of a player in it is given by the relative number of players on which behalf the
player acts in the coalition, including himself. This means that the shares depend on the
structure of the subgraph on the component of which the coalition is a subset and not just
on the structure of the subgraph on the coalition itself as is the case for the Myerson value
and the position value. This property guarantees that the value is an element of the core.
It is not hard to compute the component fairness solution. If n is the number of
players, the value can be calculated as follows. First, for each player i, a permutation πi is
determined satisfying that player j has a higher rank than player k if player j lies on the
unique path connecting player i and player k. Any permutation that satisﬁes this condition
leads to the same marginal vector. Next, the component fairness solution is the average
of the n marginal vectors obtained in this way. In general, the calculation of the Myerson
value and the position value is more complex from a computational point of view. The
Myerson value is the average of n! marginal vectors and the position value is the solution
to a system of n equations. For larger n this may take quite some computational time. For
example, if there are ten players, the new value is the average of just ten marginal vectors,
whereas the Myerson value is the average of about 3.6 million marginal vectors and for the
position value a system of ten equations has to be solved.
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